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Abstract
The large-scale interventions by Western governments in 2008 aimed at underpinning the
banking system have confirmed the extent of state support for the financial sector. The
explicit backing of the “lender of last resort” has reemphasised the moral hazard problem.
Without further reform of the markets, the current infrastructure has become one in which
private sector profits are privatised, but losses are socialised at taxpayer expense. This paper
assesses the extent of moral hazard risk now inherent in the banking system, and makes
recommendations that will help to mitigate this risk. We provide policy suggestions in the
areas of central bank communications, systemic risk, and dealing with the too-big-to-fail
bank.
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31. Introduction
Terms such as too-big-to-fail (TBTF), lender-of-last-resort (LoLR) and moral hazard are closely
related. They are all connected with the overall objective of safeguarding the public’s deposit money
should a financial institution collapse. In essence they refer to how the government, or more
specifically its central bank, would come to the rescue of a bank in financial crisis, because a bank on
the brink of bankruptcy would have a destabilising effect on the entire financial system. Spill-over
effects are closely related to systemic risk. Hence this kind of protection afforded to a bank may make
it TBTF for the system.
In this article we consider the new reality of the role of government in the financial system in the post-
credit crunch era. We describe how moral hazard will remain in the system, and provide
recommendations for how to mitigate this risk exposure, as well as dealing with the issue of the TBTF
bank.
2. Living with moral hazard
One result of the 2007-08 financial crisis is that governments and central banks are now playing a
pivotal role in maintaining moral hazard. A reaffirmation of their position as LoLR creates a dual
principle. First of all it gives a strong signal to deposit holders not to withdraw their money from
banks, as they should expect that the central bank will place unlimited resources at the disposal of
private banks to keep the credit process going. Secondly it encourages deposit holders to place their
money at the bank with the highest deposit interest rate.
Banks in turn compete against each other to attract deposits. The bank that is able to pay the highest
deposit rate will, all else being equal, attract most deposits. This is only sustainable from a bottom-line
viewpoint by taking on more risk on the asset side of the balance sheet.
This happened with the UK bank Northern Rock plc. In part due to its more aggressive credit
portfolio, the bank was able to pay out a higher rate on its clients deposit accounts compared to that
paid by the big “high street” banks (Cooper 2008). At the US Federal Reserve, this moral hazard
principle was emphasised by a number of unfortunate comments from Alan Greenspan. On occasion
he gave the market the impression that the Federal Reserve would put a floor under financial markets
in general. During a speech at the Economic Club of NY in December 2002, he stated: “Asset bubbles
cannot be detected and monetary policy ought not to be in any case used to offset them. The collapse
of bubbles can be detected, however, and monetary policy ought to be used to offset the fallout.” This
and other similar utterances became known as the “Greenspan Put.”
4The latter has come under severe criticism as this safety net gives the impression that profits within the
banking industry will remain privatised, but any losses will be socialised at taxpayers’ expense.
Protecting the public’s money is a noble objective, however bailing out banks comes with a cost that
the taxpayer has to pay for. The cost post-credit crunch is now in the trillions. The total bill, for bailing
out the banking sector and injecting stimulus packages into the global economy, has risen to just
below $20 trillion, the majority in the US (see Figure 1). These numbers are unprecedented, even
compared to inflation-adjusted levels seen during the 1930s.
Figure 1 Global Bailout Bill
Global Overview
Country $ bln
US* 14,499.00
EU** 1,972.80
Japan 375
UK*** 2,888.20
IMF 140.20
Total 19,875.20
* excluding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
** EURUSD rate 1.40
*** GBPUSD rate 1.60
Source: US Treasury, Federal Reserve, FDIC, IMF
Figure 2 Overview of bank bailouts
Date Event
16/03/2008 Bear Stearns bailed out by a joint effort from JP Morgan and the US Federal Reserve, which provides
a credit line of USD 30 bln
07/09/2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are bailed out by the US government for an amount of USD 200 bln in
preferred stock and credit lines
15/09/2008 Lehman Brothers: Allowed to fail by US Treasury Secretary, creates bank liquidity crisis
16/09/2008 AIG receives a rescue package of USD 85 bln from the US government
25/09/2008 Washington Mutual comes under control of the US government, the majority of its assets are sold to JP
Morgan
29/09/2008 Glitnir Bank is nationalised by the Icelandic government
Mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley is nationalised by the UK government
30/09/2008 Dexia Bank receives support from the Belgian government via a capital injection
Irish government guarantees all deposits, and the senior and subordina ted debt of all six Irish banks
03/10/2008 Fortis Bank is split into in three parts by the Benelux governements
US Congress approves TARP plan for USD 750 bln to buy toxic assets from banks
06/10/2008 Hypo Real Estate receives a government facilitated credit line from the Federal German government
13/10/2008 RBS, HBOS and Lloyds receive USD 64 bln from UK government
EU commits EUR 1.3 trill ion to support banks
16/10/2008 Hungary receives a EUR 5 billion credit line from the ECB
28/10/2008 IMF offers a USD 25 billion support package to Hungary
16/01/2009 BoA receives suport package from US government under the form of preferred equity injection
19/01/2009 UK government raises its stake in RBS to 70%
10/02/2009 US government announces the Public-Private Investment Programme of up to $ 1 trillion to purchase
troubled assets
Source: BIS 2009, www.creditwritedowns.com
5Figure 2 gives a (non-exhaustive) overview of the bailouts undertaken since the start of the crisis. This
excludes the coordinated measures taken by central banks, such as the establishment of USD swap
lines, to ease short term pressures in the money market. Figure 2 gives an idea of the extent of the
moral hazard.
There is no doubt that the existence of a safety net creates an unconscious reflex in bank senior
management to take on more risk. Perhaps not currently, because in the immediate post-crisis
environment investors remain risk averse; but as the economy recovers the issue will become more
problematic. Due to competitive pressures in banking a higher risk-reward profile becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy, as banks seek to generate more customer business and attract deposits.
This appears to be what happened when Goldman Sachs (along with Morgan Stanley) converted into a
commercial bank in September 2008. It forced to make this change because of the interbank market
implosion created by the Lehman Brothers collapse. It was a blunt acknowledgment that its
“investment bank” model of finance had become unsustainable, and that it needed the cushion of bank
deposits, as well as the LoLR backing, to stay afloat amidst the market turmoil.
Goldmans received a rescue package of $10 billion from the US government Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP). With this explicit guarantee, it proceeded to take on even bigger risks during Q1
2009, a period when other financial market participants were scaling back their risk exposures. During
Q1 and Q2 of 2009 Goldmans extended its value-at-risk (VaR) limits to record highs, on risks led by
equity trading (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 Goldman Sachs VaR exposure( USD mm)
Quarter End Value-at Risk
(daily average)
Jun-09 $ 245
Mar-09 $ 240
Nov-08 $ 197
Aug-08 $ 181
May-08 $ 184
Feb-08 $ 157
Nov-07 $ 151
Aug-07 $ 139
May-07 $ 133
Feb-07 $ 127
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
If one takes a closer look at the results it is striking that the revenues are pure investment banking and
trading related (see Figure 4). In other words, the revenues are unrelated to any form of commercial
banking business. This is despite the fact that the firm applied for a banking license in September
62008, in order to be able to access TARP funds. In other words, Goldmans is a licensed commercial
bank, with all the implicit LoLR backing that this implies, but which carries out very little
conventional commercial banking business.
Figure 4 Goldman Sachs net revenue, Q2 2009
Division Net Revenue Change (YOY)
Equity underwriting $ 736 mio 19%
Debt underwrit ing $ 336 mio 25%
Fixed Income, Currency and Commodit ies $ 6.8 bio 186%
Investment Banking Advisory, mergers and acquisitions $ 368 mio -54%
Total Trading and Principle Investments $ 10.8 bio 93%
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
The question remains then whether the US government was justified in offering Goldman Sachs this
lifeline. Once it received government assistance, Goldmans had access to cheap credit lines from the
Federal Reserve, and proceeded to increase its risk exposure and further distance itself from
competitors.
Continuing moral hazard is an issue that needs to be solved sooner rather than later if we are to avoid a
re-occurrence of the crisis. However this is not an easy task. The principle of LoLR has merit. The
Great Depression in the 1930s could have been more contained if the central bank had played a more
dominant role. In essence we have a conundrum that is not easily solved.
For the foreseeable future the LoLR concept will not disappear. It is necessary for the safe operation of
the financial system. We observed during the Lehman collapse the effects when a government and
central bank lets market forces act freely: at one stage in October 2008 it appeared as if the entire
Western banking system might collapse, with disastrous consequences for the entire economy, if
governments had not stepped in to guarantee liabilities. It is an economic law that in this case the fall
in asset prices relative to current output prices would have been greater but for state intervention.
Furthermore the drop in investments and consumption would be substantial and the decline in income
and employment would be larger as well. So the public sector must step in for the “greater good”, in a
way that does not apply to other industrial sectors.
3. Mitigating moral hazard risk
Thus, moral hazard has seemingly become an inescapable fact of life. The ultimate solution to the
problem may be no more ambitious than reducing (rather than attempting to eliminate) moral hazard,
without curtailing risk taking. To that end, we require new regulations. Three major issues around
moral hazard and the TBTF issue need to be addressed:
7 Transparent communication by central banks about moral hazard;
 The interconnection of financial markets and the systemic risk related to it;
 Consolidation trends and the risks of “too-big-to-fail”.
We discuss each of these points individually.
3.1 Transparent communication by central banks about moral hazard
As we noted above the crisis was underpinned by a false perception that unsecured institutions, for
example those that do not fall under US FDIC protection, would nevertheless be regarded as TBTF by
the US government. This perception was first created by frequent interventions by central banks
during the past four decades, and exacerbated by the dubious rhetoric of Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan. Current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke recognises this issue however, stating “market
discipline may erode further if market participants believe that, to avoid the risk of a financial crisis,
the government will step in to prevent the failure of any very large institution – the ‘too-big-to-fail
problem”(Bernanke 2007).
As a first step, the Federal Reserve and other central banks need to modify their rhetoric and start
informing the market that there is no absolute floor under the markets, and that their expectations of
being rescued must be diminished. If not, market discipline, as we have seen from Goldman Sachs,
will not change. Of course this is not a short-term solution, but something that can only take place over
time. Perceptions built up over 20 years do not evaporate overnight. It is important however that
governments act now, rather than wait until the next crisis. The opportunity should be taken on a
regular basis when communicating monetary policy, for example during the press conference after
Bank of England, ECB or Federal Open Market Committee meetings, and at the Humphrey Hawkins
testimonies.
In addition to the frequency of communication, its quality needs to be raised as well. General
comments along the lines of “banks are at risk of losses due to excessive risk taking” are not going to
change market mentality. Central banks and other institutions such as the FDIC must disclose more
information on the research they are conducting on how to maintain financial stability. For example,
the FDIC is doing research on procedures and methodologies in identifying which depositors it must
protect and which it can impose losses on. This type of research needs a wide readership.
The most important aspect of increased communication towards the market should be in explaining
how central banks undertake market stabilisation efforts, and estimate future losses that have to be
taken by creditors.
83.2 The interconnection of financial markets and systemic risk
We accept that more transparent communication on its own will not solve the problem. Stronger
measures are needed to reduce the frequency with which central banks and governments bail out
banks.
The reason why a LoLR facility is put in place is to avoid spill-over effects towards other banks and
ultimately prevent a bank run. Banking is ultimately a business based on confidence. The instant that
customers start withdrawing their deposits on a large scale, banks are in trouble and will need to be
bailed out (either by takeover or merger with another bank or buy outright support from the LoLR).
The basic bank business model relies on leverage, with only a small fraction of a bank’s liabilities held
in reserve at the central bank. As bank funding is based on borrowing in the interbank market,
systemic risk is inherent in the model.
Therefore the authorities must place more focus on the following:
 Setting strict liquidity ratio limits, imposed by the regulator, as well as requirements to diversify
funding sources, reduce reliance on single funding sources, and increase the average tenor of
liabilities; the UK’s FSA has already started the process to implement a much stricter liquidity
regime for banks (FSA 2008);
 The establishment of a global central clearing agency for OTC derivatives; efforts are already
underway to set this up for credit derivatives, and such a system would help to reduce bilateral
counterparty risk. An alternative is for regional clearing centres based on currency;
 The establishment of a clearing house for the money markets, a so-called “International Money
Exchange” for the interbank market that would work similarly to an exchange clearing house
(Choudhry 2009); such a facility would serve to make the interbank market more robust during
times of crisis or illiquidity, because it is at these times that banks withdraw credit lines with other
banks. A central clearing mechanism that eliminated bilateral counterparty risk would make it less
likely that banks would withdraw lines;
 Reducing leverage, if necessary by regulatory fiat, through the imposition of leverage limits on
banks;
 Imposing higher capital ratios than currently in place under Basel II, tailored according to the
bank’s size, its extent of risk exposure and the amount if systemic risk it represents;
 Developing new capital instruments which absorb losses in distressed situations. Our
recommendation is that banks promote a product which has similar features to a classic reverse
convertible bond. Banks would issue so-called reverse convertible debentures, which would
automatically convert into equity once the minimum capital ratio level of a bank is breached.
9The above measures once implemented would reduce the likelihood that a central bank or government
would have to bail out the banks during the next economic downturn.
3.3 Consolidation trends and the risk of “too-big-to-fail”
The current debate on TBTF raises the issue that such banks should be made smaller. This does appear
at first sight to be a reasonable idea.
The case for this is strong when considering the Icelandic banks, which could not be rescued by their
government since they had outgrown their own country’s GDP. In this decade these banks grew from
being domestic lenders to major international players. During the expansion they acquired foreign
assets of almost ten times the country’s GDP (this from almost two times GDP in 2003). Furthermore
almost 80% of these assets were in foreign currency, making them extremely vulnerable to foreign
exchange volatility. When the bubble burst the government had to ask the IMF for an emergency loan
or risk the total collapse of the banking system and thereby the economy.
However, these banks were not a major threat to the international banking system. European banks did
make writedowns on the collapse of Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki; nevertheless the impact was
not on the scale of the Lehman collapse.
The case of Ireland, which is a member of the euro-zone, provides stronger backing for advocates of
making banks smaller. Unlike the Icelandic banks, who decided to become international players, the
Irish banks focused mainly on their home market and the UK. The Irish banking industry grew hand-
in-hand with the domestic real estate boom. Between 1998 and 2007 house prices in real terms
quadrupled on a national level. When the housing bubble burst, Irish banks were heavily exposed and
as Figure 5 shows their capital ratios were not robust enough to survive the shock. The Irish
government was forced to provide explicit backing for its banks; one impact of this was that the
Ireland sovereign rating was cut from AAA, on fears that the public sector debt liability created by the
guarantees would become unsustainable. Ultimately the majority of Irish banks were effectively
nationalised. The Irish situation was not that dramatic compared to the Icelandic one for a simple
reason: Ireland had the safety net of the euro-zone. This in itself exposed euro-zone taxpayers to
potential losses if the government itself had needed to be bailed out.
Despite the deleveraging process that has been going on since the start of the crisis, some major
international banks are still bigger than their own country’s GDP. This is certainly the case for the
Swiss banks UBS and Credit Suisse. At the end of 2008 Credit Suisse balance sheet was 2.72 times
and UBS’s 4.18 times the GDP of Switzerland (see Figures 5 and 6).
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Figure 5 also proves that (contrary to popular belief) European banks were and still are more leveraged
than American banks, and that no UK or German bank outgrew its country’s GDP.
However in countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium one can notice a similar pattern to that in
Switzerland. The Dutch bank ING clearly became TBTF for the government as its total assets were
1.53 times the GDP of the Netherlands. This was also the reason why, in the case of Fortis Bank, the
Benelux countries implemented a joint rescue plan to save it.
11
Figure 5 Bank overview of leverage and total assets
Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
JPMorgan Chase & Co
Total Assets 715,345 693,575 758,800 770,912 1,157,248 1,198,942 1,351,520 1,562,147 2,175,052
Financial Leverage 18.62 17.41 17.85 17.7 12.82 11.09 11.44 12.19 14.48
Tier 1 / Core 8.50 8.29 8.24 8.50 8.70 8.50 8.70 8.40 10.90
Bank of America Corp
Total Assets 642,191 621,764 660,951 719,483 1,110,432 1,291,803 1,459,737 1,715,746 1,817,943
Financial Leverage 13.87 13.16 12.99 14.06 12.37 11.94 11.77 11.55 12.54
Tier 1 / Core 7.50 8.30 8.22 7.85 8.20 8.25 8.64 6.87 9.15
Citigroup
Total Assets 902,210 1,051,450 1,097,190 1,264,032 1,484,101 1,494,037 1,884,318 2,187,480 1,938,470
Financial Leverage 14.05 13.55 13.02 12.96 13.4 13.56 14.68 17.53 22.37
Tier 1 / Core 8.38 8.42 8.47 8.91 8.74 8.79 8.59 7.12 11.92
Royal Bank of Scotland
Total Assets 320,004 368,859 412,000 454,428 588,122 776,827 871,432 1,840,829 2,401,652
Financial Leverage 18.64 16.65 17.04 18.55 18.26 19.68 21.78 29.08 37.91
Tier 1 / Core 6.90 7.10 7.30 7.40 7.00 7.60 7.50 7.30 10.00
HSBC Holdings
Total Assets 674,129.90 696,079.60 758,605 1,034,216 1,279,974 1,501,970 1,860,758 2,354,266 2,527,465
Financial Leverage 15.69 14.9 14.82 14.2 14.46 15.63 16.75 17.82 22.01
Tier 1 / Core 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.90 8.90 9.00 9.40 9.30 8.30
Wells Fargo & Co
Total Assets 272,426 307,569 349,197 387,798 427,849 481,741 481,996 575,442 1,309,639
Financial Leverage 10.31 10.87 11.44 11.38 11.27 11.63 11.23 11.41 16.4
Tier 1 / Core 7.29 6.99 7.70 8.42 8.41 8.26 8.95 7.59 7.84
Mitsubishi UFJ Fin Group
Total Assets No data No data 99,489.26 99,175.32 106,615.50 110,285.50 187,046.80 187,281 192,993.20
Financial Leverage No data No data No data No data 31.07 25.74 26.62 25.05 24.18
Tier 1 / Core No data No data 5.27 5.68 7.15 7.62 6.80 7.59 7.60
Santander Central Hispano
Total Assets 348,871.90 358,116.20 324,193.30 351,780.40 664,486.30 809,106.90 833,872.70 912,915 1,049,632
Financial Leverage 19.43 16.51 14.86 13.8 17.09 19.86 19.41 17.46 17.4
Tier 1 / Core 7.64 8.44 8.01 8.26 7.16 7.88 7.42 7.71 9.10
Goldman Sachs
Total Assets 289,760 312,218 355,574 403,799 531,379 706,804 838,201 1,119,796 884,547
Financial Leverage 20.25 17.32 17.94 18.69 20.02 24.12 26.21 27.05 22.88
Tier 1 / Core No data No data No data No data No data No data No data No data 15.60
BNP Paribas
Total Assets 693,315 825,288 710,305 782,996 1,002,503 1,258,079 1,440,343 1,694,454 2,075,551
Financial Leverage 33.62 32.86 30.09 27.31 29.49 30.95 31.46 34.03 42
Tier 1 / Core 7.10 7.30 8.10 9.40 7.50 7.60 7.40 7.30 7.80
Barclays Bank
Total Assets 316,190 356,612 403,062 443,262 538,181 924,357 996,787 1,227,361 2,052,980
Financial Leverage 26.35 24.31 25.59 26.8 30.44 43.93 51.61 51.62 54.76
Tier 1 / Core 7.20 7.80 8.20 7.90 7.60 6.90 7.70 7.80 8.60
Mizuho Financial Group
Total Assets N/A N/A N/A 134,007.20 137,750.10 143,076.20 149,612.80 149,880 154,412.10
Financial Leverage N/A N/A N/A N/A 503.63 129.51 62.49 36.81 38.85
Tier 1 / Core No data No data No data 4.87 5.76 6.20 5.89 6.96 7.40
Morgan Stanley
Total Assets 426,794 482,628 529,499 602,843 747,334 898,523 1,121,192 1,045,409 658,812
Financial Leverage 22.6 23.26 23.95 24.22 25.44 28.68 31.83 33.63 27.56
Tier 1 / Core No data No data No data No data No data No data No data No data 17.90
Uncredit
Total Assets 202,655.50 208,388.10 213,349.30 238,255.60 265,406.20 787,000.30 823,284.20 1,021,835 1,045,612
Financial Leverage 23.45 22.77 19.53 18.06 18.81 21.44 21.86 19.19 18.35
Tier 1 / Core 6.37 6.79 7.21 6.96 7.94 6.89 5.82 6.55 6.66
Sumitomo Mitsui Fin Group
Total Assets N/A N/A N/A 104,586.80 102,215.20 99,731.86 107,010.60 100,858.30 111,955.90
Financial Leverage N/A N/A N/A N/A 108.7 89.01 51.84 31.7 31.38
Tier 1 / Core No data No data No data 5.50 6.03 5.39 7.11 6.44 65.73
ING Bank
Total Assets 650,172 705,119 716,370 778,771 876,391 1,158,639 1,226,307 1,312,510 1,331,663
Financial Leverage 19.1 28.97 35.74 37.77 36.46 33.47 31.8 33.64 40.97
Tier 1 / Core No data 7.03 7.31 7.59 7.30 7.32 7.63 7.39 9.32
Deutsche Bank
Total Assets 928,994 918,222 758,355 803,614 840,068 992,161 1,584,493 2,020,349 2,202,423
Financial Leverage 26.29 22.02 23.89 26.84 30.38 32.81 41.1 51.64 62.33
Tier 1 / Core 7.80 8.10 9.60 10.00 8.60 8.70 8.50 8.60 10.10
Societe Generale
Total Assets 455,881 512,499 501,265 539,224 601,355 835,134 956,841 1,071,762 1,130,003
Financial Leverage 33.7 32.9 32.2 32.07 32.46 34.64 34.4 36.04 34.77
Tier 1 / Core 8.91 8.36 8.14 8.66 7.69 7.57 7.82 6.62 7.88
Credit Suisse Group
Total Assets 979,121 1,016,078 1,027,158 1,004,308 1,089,485 1,339,052 1,255,956 1,360,680 1,170,350
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Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
UBS
Total Assets 1,087,552 1,253,297 1,181,118 1,386,000 1,737,118 2,058,348 2,396,511 2,274,891 2,014,815
Financial Leverage 27.49 26.49 29.5 34.49 45.01 48.69 47.54 53.97 61.81
Tier 1 / Core No data 11.60 11.30 11.80 11.90 12.80 11.90 9.10 11.00
Commerzbank
Total Assets 454,904 501,312 422,134 381,585 424,877 444,861 608,278 616,474 625,196
Financial Leverage 34.85 39.38 44.9 44.9 42.79 38.73 39.09 41.7 36.11
Tier 1 / Core 6.50 6.20 7.30 7.30 7.50 8.10 6.70 7.00 10.10
Fortis Bank
Total Assets 438,082.70 482,875.10 485,668 523,364.20 614,085.30 728,994.50 775,229 871,179 92,870
Financial Leverage 29.41 31.82 39.49 44.68 41.9 39.2 38.01 30.66 24.2
Tier 1 / Core 7.30 8.50 8.20 7.90 8.30 7.40 7.10 No data No data
HBOS
Total Assets N/A 312,071 355,030 408,413 448,165 540,873 591,813 666,947 689,917
Financial Leverage N/A N/A 27.42 26.99 26.91 28.92 29.94 29.87 40.08
Tier 1 / Core No data 7.90 7.90 7.60 7.90 8.10 8.10 7.70 6.00
Dexia
Total Assets 257,726 351,250 350,692 349,463 388,787 508,761 566,743 604,564 651,006
Financial Leverage 42.6 41.28 40.82 38.42 33.46 32.98 37.15 40.29 67.66
Tier 1 / Core 9.30 9.30 9.30 9.90 10.00 10.30 9.80 9.10 10.60
Lloyds TSB Group
Total Assets 219,113 235,793 252,561 252,012 284,422 309,754 343,598 353,346 436,033
Financial Leverage 21.24 22.32 26.69 28.72 25.95 27.97 30.6 29.92 36.66
Tier 1 / Core 8.20 8.40 7.70 9.50 8.20 7.90 8.20 8.10 8.00
KBC Group
Total Assets 187,658 227,759.20 221,730.50 225,586.80 285,163 325,801 325,400 355,597 355,317
Financial Leverage 34.42 31.21 28.16 25.45 23.78 21.76 19.86 19.81 22.53
Tier 1 / Core 9.50 8.80 8.83 9.54 10.07 9.40 8.70 7.40 7.20
Allied Irish Bank
Total Assets 80,250 89,359 85,821 80,960 101,109 133,214 158,526 177,862 182,143
Financial Leverage 17.14 17.27 19.34 18.28 17.04 18.87 19.74 19.29 20.26
Tier 1 / Core 6.30 6.50 6.90 7.10 8.20 7.20 8.20 7.50 7.40
Anglo Irish Bank
Total Assets 11,047.30 15,776 19,417.80 25,520.10 34,339.80 48,413 73,290 96,652 101,321
Financial Leverage 32.27 32.75 29.29 27.73 21.32 20.56 25.29 25.23 24.21
Tier 1 / Core 32.27 32.75 29.29 27.73 21.32 20.56 25.29 25.23 24.21
Bank Of Ireland
Total Assets 68,017 78,875 87,298 89,303 106,431 127,780 162,212 188,813 197,434
Financial Leverage 20.09 20.79 20.84 21.56 23.58 27.41 30.67 29.47 29.24
Tier 1 / Core 7.40 7.80 7.60 8.00 7.20 7.90 7.50 8.20 8.10
Irish Nationwide Building Soc
Total Assets No data No data 5,574.75 5,953.20 8,554.10 10,994.50 14,629 16,099.10 14,429.30
Financial Leverage No data No data 12.29 11.01 10.97 11.60 11.61 11.18 11.31
Tier 1 / Core No data No data 11.00 11.59 10.07 13.71 No data 8.60 7.40
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
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Figure 6 GDP per country
Country GDP $ millions
US 14,264,600
Japan 4,923,761
Germany 3,667,513
France 2,865,737
UK 2,674,085
Italy 2,313,893
Spain 1,611,767
Netherlands 868,940
Belgium 506,392
Switzerland 492,595
Ireland 273,248
Source: IMF
While in principle we agree with the idea of breaking up banks that are too large, there are practical
difficulties with so doing. First, what metric would be used to determine whether a bank is too big? A
simplistic measure of looking at the total size of assets on the balance sheet is not the answer.
It is perfectly plausible that a bank’s total assets increase via organic growth. In this case it would be
unfair to penalise this development, certainly where the quality of assets are perfectly matched with
outstanding liabilities. To make a comparison, one would not necessarily break up the US retail
distributor Wallmart or the UK supermarket chain Tesco simply because either had a dominant market
position. That said, neither of these corporate institutions is relying on the LoLR, and neither
represents any kind of “systemic” risk to the economy.
But where regulators have a stronger case is in the area of growth through mergers and/or acquisition.
When this takes place, regulators must look closely at how the transaction is funded. It is now obvious
that Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis suffered as a result of taking over ABN Amro without having a
waterproof funding strategy in place behind the transaction.
Even a smaller bank is no guarantee that systemic risk would diminish. Some banks are small in assets
but still impose a huge risk for a potential run on the banking system. Northern Rock and Bear Stearns
were very good examples of that. So it becomes important that a range of quantitative and qualitative
assessments need to be made before one can decide that a bank has become too big. Central banks,
which have a considerable amount of private information at hand, are in a position to make that
judgement call. However a policymaker who needs to streamline this into a simple metric legal
framework is less capable of doing this.
There is also the issue of what to do with banks that are already too big. This would mean that they
have to be broken up. The question then is who will buy the assets? At what price are they going to be
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sold? These are not insurmountable problems, they simply need careful consideration. We recommend
that as far as possible, viable business lines are hived off into stand-alone operations under existing
management. This would be perfectly feasible in the case of most multinational banking groups, which
often take over overseas banking chains as a complete whole.
When governments succeed in breaking up big banks, they will face substantial pressure not to allow
these companies to grow too large again. There is precedent for this in other industries; for example
the break-up of AT&T in the US. This triggered subsequent mergers among other telecommunication
firms, which subsequently became large organisations. In the US there is legislation in place to block a
merger or acquisition if the bank is left with more than 10% of the total deposit base of the market. We
recommend a similar cap in other countries.
It is evident that certain banks became too big during the last 10 years, to the extent that the prosperity
of a country and its citizens was placed in jeopardy. The best examples were Citigroup and RBOS.
There was a side negative impact as well, as big banks lost focus on the relationship side. The banking
sector is in theory still synonymous with being a financial service industry; however it appears that
over the years the people in the business neglected “service” in their business model. Putting the
clients’ needs first should become a priority again, and to do this we will need a change in approach
and emphasis among bank senior management.
Keeping the size of banks in check should be first achieved by keeping quantitative measures, such as
liquidity and leverage ratios, under strict limits as we suggested above. However if regulators do not
succeed in keeping banks in line using these restrictions, then downsizing the total asset size of a bank
below a certain percentage of the GDP of its own country must become the solution of last resort.
4. Conclusions
The events of 2007-2008 have resulted in an unavoidable state of affairs that combines government
guarantees of virtually the entire Western banking system alongside potentially significant moral
hazard. This arrangement became necessary to prevent complete collapse in the global economy
following the Lehman’s default, when it appeared that many large Western banks were about to go
bankrupt. Therefore in the foreseeable future we do not expect that the current market structure will
change.
Given the risks that such moral hazard implies, which essentially allows banks to take as much risk
exposure as they wish to maximise profit in the knowledge that should they incur large losses they will
be bailed out, it becomes important for governments and regulators to act decisively to mitigate these
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risks. We have proposed three areas in which policy makers should implement strict rules as part of a
new bank business model, which will reduce the likelihood that the LoLR has to intervene during the
next economic downturn.
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